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What are the economic benefits of the peacetime operations of the U.S. Navy? Over 
the years, that has been one of the more elusive questions posed to and by the Navy. 
Today’s phenomenon of globalization makes the question even more pertinent, and 
this initial question can be extended to ask: What is the impact of these economic 
benefits on globalization? Since naval forward presence (also known as forward 
engagement or, simply, naval presence) is the dominant mission of peacetime naval 
operations, a starting point would be the examination of the economic benefits to 
the United States and allied countries provided by U.S. naval forward presence. 
Forward presence is presumed to enable timely crisis response. But while most 
authorities on the subject contend that these benefits are significant, their 
measurement has always been fraught with conceptual and computational 
difficulties. The greatest difficulty has always involved developing a convincing 
counterfactual—what would the state of affairs have been in the absence of forward 
deployed naval forces? 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a taste of the research being conducted at 
the Naval Postgraduate School in identifying and measuring the economic benefits 
of naval forward presence. This chapter briefly summarizes two previous studies 
that identify the levels of economic benefit and provides details of a third, more 
recent study that attempts to tie the benefits of forward presence to the globalization 
phenomenon (as reflected in the collective impact on groups of countries with 
differing levels of economic globalization). The chapter does not attempt to 
replicate the methodology of the first two studies and argue their merit—indeed, 
that has been done elsewhere. 
1 Readers interested in challenging the validity of our findings on the levels of 
economic benefits to the United States and its allies (reflected in oil futures and 
market indices) achieved by forward presence are referred to the two study reports 
themselves. Rather, this chapter introduces the argument that: the greater the level 
of integration into the global economy for any state, the greater is the beneficial 
impact of U.S. naval forward presence on its economy.2 
Development of a Methodology: Effects on Oil Futures 
The issue of how to quantify the economic benefits of naval forward presence came 
to the fore in preparing for the Congressionally mandated 1997 Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDR). Early in that process, Navy leaders asked if the economic 
benefits of forward engaged naval forces could be quantified and thereby 
communicated to policymakers. Until this point, the only evidence of such benefits 
was anecdotal.3 At that time the Naval Postgraduate School was asked to develop 
new methodologies directed toward the quantification of these benefits. 
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In our initial study of this issue (1997), we developed a methodology focused on the 
effects of naval forward engagement and crisis response on world oil prices, as 
reflected by oil futures markets.4 Using a vector autoregression econometric model,5 
this approach linked the oil price effects associated with naval forward engagement 
and crisis response to changes in major economic indicators. 
This methodology was then applied to three cases of naval forward engagement and 
crisis response: the opening stages of Operation Desert Shield (1990 Gulf War); the 
Iraq-Kuwait border incident of October 1994; and the January 1987 Gulf shipping 
crisis (reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers and defense of other shipping during the Iran-
Iraq war). These crises varied in terms of the military threat posed to U.S. and allied 
interests, oil market conditions, business cycles, and the general world economic 
climate. But a clear trend emerged from the analysis of each incident. When oil 
futures markets become aware of naval forward engagement/crisis response, oil 
prices decline. 
By stabilizing and lowering prices in oil futures markets during these crises, naval 
forward presence provided significant benefits to the U.S. economy. These benefits 
can be measured in terms of dollar losses that would have occurred in the absence 
of timely crisis response facilitated by naval presence. Conservative estimates (all 
in 1997 dollars) indicate that naval crisis response in the opening stages of Desert 
Storm provided $55.22 billion worth of economic benefits (in terms of gross 
domestic product [GDP]) to the United States. Similarly, naval forward engagement 
during the 1994 Iraq-Kuwait border incident yielded $7.13 billion in benefits, while 
naval forward engagement during the 1987 Gulf shipping crisis produced $5.01 
billion in benefits. Naval forward engagement and crisis response had a positive 
impact not only on the U.S. economy but also on the economies of America’s allies. 
Naval crisis response in the opening stages of Desert Storm alone is likely to have 
provided up to an $86.8 billion increase in world income (in terms of GDP). 
Several major findings emerged from the initial study: 
? Most important, it is possible to develop procedures to quantitatively measure some of the 
economic impacts of naval forward presence.  
? Economic impacts can be measured in terms of dollar cost savings and/or additional dollar 
resources available to the economy.  
? These economic impacts can be significant. They may also persist over a fairly long time 
period and across the economies of a large number of U.S. allies.  
? While these initial estimates of the economic benefits associated with naval forward presence 
may appear high, it is also apparent that they actually underestimate the complete benefits 
associated with crisis response—one simply cannot put a hard figure on the total benefits 
from avoidance of the crises prevented by the forward presence of the Navy.  
The 1997 study concluded that economic benefits associated with naval forward 
engagement in the Gulf region would most likely outweigh the actual financial 
costs associated with these operations. Given the nature of oil markets and the 
volatility of the region, it is safe to assume that naval forward engagement probably 
would continue to yield significant economic gains in the future. 
Methodological Issues 
The main difficulties in estimating the economic benefits derived from naval 
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forward presence and crisis response are in establishing a credible counterfactual 
argument and a meaningful measure of impact. Specifically, what would have been 
the state of the U.S. economy if naval forces had not responded to the crisis at 
hand? Given that naval forces did respond, what is the relevant measure to capture 
the economic impact associated with this response? 
Both problems are fraught with a number of conceptual issues that need to be 
resolved before the calculation of economic benefits can be undertaken. First, by 
their nature, crises tend to have a negative impact on markets and economic 
activity. Forward engaged naval forces are often the first to respond to a crisis, and 
their arrival on scene usually has a stabilizing political influence. The stabilizing 
influence extends to economic activity as well. Oil appears to be the most tractable 
vehicle for analyzing the economic benefit of naval forward presence and crisis 
response. Because oil is essential to nearly all economic activity in the 
industrialized world, price movements of that commodity in reaction to world 
events provide a useful index of the overall economic impact of international crises 
and of the response of naval forces to them. 
Second, it is essential to select an index capable of reflecting the market’s 
interpretation of the severity of a crisis as well as the degree to which trader 
confidence is restored following the response of naval forces to a crisis. Because oil 
futures prices provide more information than spot prices, the first study uses futures 
prices to explore the effect of naval forward presence and crisis response. Oil 
futures markets serve as an efficient substitute for the bulk storage of oil. Instead of 
stockpiling oil reserves, futures markets such as the New York Mercantile 
Exchange allow companies to purchase contracts to buy or sell oil at some future 
time. These contracts are transacted for individual months in the future. Traders 
base their offers on the best economic, political, and military information available 
to them at the time the contract is traded. As a result, futures prices are considered 
to be the most unbiased estimate of the likely spot or daily price of oil when the 
contracted delivery date actually arrives.6 
Of course, one still has great difficulty in arguing convincingly that changes in oil 
prices or other key economic variables during a period of crisis were due in large 
part to the movement of naval forces from forward presence positions. Even though 
a clear pattern seemed to exist between crisis response and oil price movement in 
our earlier cases in the Gulf, the strongest arguments making this link had to rely 
largely on the process of elimination; that is, no other credible events could have 
produced the observed pattern of oil prices. 
A way to overcome this difficulty is to examine effects on other markets concerned 
with safety of supplies, access to raw materials, and future economic conditions. 
With increased globalization and the increased interlinking of markets, it is clear 
that naval actions are likely to affect exchange rates, share values, and a whole host 
of related commodity indexes. Associated movements in these markets are also 
likely to affect the U.S. economy. Specifically, associated movements in one or 
more of these markets may enhance the positive impacts of naval actions or, 
conversely, offset the oil-derived benefits. For example, although naval crisis 
response often lowers oil prices, it may simultaneously weaken the yen, providing 
Japanese exporters with a competitive edge in the U.S. market. Subsequently, 
increased imports and associated loss of jobs could conceivably offset all of the 
benefits derived from lower oil prices. 
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Beyond the Gulf: Association between Naval Events and Markets 
With the methodological issues in mind, a second study (2000) was undertaken to 
address the limitations of the first, while at the same time strengthening and 
extending our basic methodology. The new elements included the use of a highly 
objective statistical analysis (cointegration, error correction) capable of quantifying 
the short- and long-run impacts of naval movements on oil prices;7 and the analysis 
of new cases of naval forward presence/crisis response. Cases were selected to 
provide our sample with greater geographical diversity and market impact. In 
addition, care was taken to assure that these cases involved primarily naval units, 
with at best limited participation from the other services. Four new cases were 
selected: 
? The Taiwan Strait crisis (1996) was selected because of its importance and also the fact that 
it did not appear to involve oil markets.  
? Operation Desert Strike (1996) was chosen to see if a crisis of very short duration involving 
naval forces was capable of altering oil markets in a manner that resulted in a significant 
impact on the U. S. economy.  
? Operation Desert Fox (1998) was selected because it represents a case where there was great 
uncertainty in oil markets concerning both Iraq’s intentions and the consequences of naval 
actions.  
? Libyan operations (1986) were chosen because they represented a time in which oil markets 
were first developing sophisticated forward markets. They also represent a case close to 
Europe and thus possible links to exchange and share markets.  
The core task for this major extension of our earlier model was to design a method 
for statistically linking naval actions and other events to price movements in key 
markets. As noted above, our earlier study made this key connection largely 
through the process of elimination. In the second study, formal event analysis 
provides a true statistical test of the association of naval actions and markets. It can 
also be used for hypothesis testing. Specific questions were asked throughout the 
study: Do naval actions increase market uncertainty, or do they provide a stabilizing 
impact? Do naval actions produce only a transitory movement in market prices, or 
are these actions responsible for longer run adjustments in these markets? If the 
latter is the case, the credibility of the forward market analysis outlined above is 
strengthened in that the consequences of naval actions are not confined to the short-
run up-and-down fluctuations of spot prices. Instead, these actions actually set in 
motion a whole series of economic adjustments that, taken as a whole, provide 
significant economic benefits. 
While oil markets were the one constant throughout the cases, several other markets 
were affected by naval actions. These include: the dollar/yen exchange rate, the 
Commodity Research Bureau commodity index, the Goldman-Sachs commodity 
index, the Standard and Poor 100, the Nikkei 100, the Hang-Seng, and the New 
York Stock Exchange composite index. In each case involving oil or commodity 
markets, naval events reduced the price from what it would have been in the 
absence of forward presence/crisis response. In the case of share markets and the 
dollar/yen exchange rate, prices were higher than they would have been if naval 
forces had not been present. 
In affecting these markets, naval events were shown to produce a short-run 
(overnight) effect in the directions noted above. More important, the analysis found 
that the impact of naval events on these markets lingers for a significant time, 
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altering prices for a period of time that allows for significant benefits to the United 
States economy. These benefits were considerable, with each operation yielding 
well over $1 billion of added GDP to the U.S. economy. 
Assessing Future Effects: Oil Price Shocks as Measures of 
Globalization 
The conclusions noted above can be the basis for assessing future economic impacts 
associated with naval forward presence/crisis response. But can we predict in 
advance the general magnitude of economic benefits accruing from similar 
operations? What methods are best to do this? What factors need to be taken into 
account? How might these change with the evolution of globalization and increased 
economic integration? Will these changes in the international economic 
environment likely strengthen or weaken the positive economic impacts associated 
with naval forward presence/crisis response? 
Addressing these issues requires us to develop an integrated framework for 
assessing the consequences of globalization on the market forces associated with 
naval forward presence/crisis response. Here we need to draw heavily on the rapidly 
expanding literature on globalization, integrating it with our quantitative findings 
on economic benefits. Focus is on the key linkages between naval forward 
presence, oil prices, and globalization. Has globalization over time strengthened or 
weakened this link? What elements of globalization have been most important in 
this regard? Are these trends likely to continue into the foreseeable future? 
In our third study (2001), the linkages between naval forward presence/crisis 
response and oil prices are examined in the context of changes in the global 
economy and the various dimensions of globalization. An operational procedure is 
developed to measure the various facets of globalization and track their movements 
over time. Next, the magnitude of oil price shocks’ effect on domestic economies is 
shown to depend critically on the global environment in which they occur. Several 
groups of countries are identified by the manner in which oil shocks reduce their 
national incomes. Because of trends in globalization, the first group of advanced 
countries—including the United States—has become more vulnerable over time to 
oil price shocks. That is, oil shocks of a given magnitude have tended over time to 
produce greater and greater reductions in GDP. The second group of countries, 
consisting largely of the top layer of developing countries led by Mexico, South 
Africa, and South Korea—is also affected by globalization, but to a lesser extent. 
While GDP is still reduced by oil price shocks in these countries, globalization 
appears to have been less of a factor. 
In short, the main finding of the third study is that naval forward presence plays an 
increasingly important role in stabilizing the economies of the advanced industrial 
nations. Other parts of the world also benefit, although trends in globalization 
suggest that, for them, the economic gains that accrue from naval forward presence 
are of a lower magnitude. 
Categorizing Globalization 
Current debates over the relative merits of globalization provide some insight into 
the manner in which market price modifications brought about by naval forward 
presence impact on the economies in different parts of the world. In a recent article, 
Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen of Cambridge University provides some basic 
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answers to several of the key elements of this debate—answers that have relevance 
to the changing economic impact of naval forward presence. Sen maintains: 
? Globalization is not new, nor is it just Westernization: Over thousands of years, globalization 
has progressed through travel, trade, migration, spread of cultural influences and 
dissemination of knowledge and understanding (including science and technology).  
? Globalization is not in itself a folly. It has enriched the world scientifically and culturally and 
benefited many people economically as well. In this regard, modern technologies as well as 
economic interrelations have been influential.  
? The use of the market economy can produce different outcomes. Specifically, the market 
economy can generate many different results, depending on how physical resources are 
distributed, how human resources are developed, what rules prevail, and so on in all these 
spheres, and the state and the society have roles, within a country and in the world.  
? The world has changed since the Bretton Woods agreement. The current economic, financial, 
and political architecture of the world (including the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund, and other institutions) was largely set up in the 1940s, following the Bretton Woods 
Conference in 1944. The implication is that the current system does not have institutions that 
are responsive to many of the changed economic circumstances, and, as such, many parts of 
the world are not well served by the current system.8  
Sen suggests that various parts of the world have evolved somewhat differently 
over the last several decades and, as a result, possess economic environments that 
respond quite differently to various types of external shocks. The main problem for 
assessing the economic consequences of naval forward presence is, therefore, one 
of deriving an operational classification of these environments. 
In this regard, Jeffrey Sachs provides a good starting point for grouping countries in 
terms of their interaction with the global economy.9 Although Sachs’ paper was 
written to provide a framework for examining the consequences of globalization for 
the growth potential of various parts of the world, it develops an initial country 
classification scheme that appears appropriate for the assessment of the manner in 
which naval forward presence market links, such as oil market price movements, 
produce a differential impact on domestic economies. As a first approximation to 
the world’s different economic environments, Sachs develops five main groupings 
(table 6—1). 
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Endogenous growth countries. These countries are experiencing the process of self-
sustaining increases in income generated mainly by technological innovation. 
Innovation raises national income, which in turn stimulates further innovation in a 
positive feedback process.10 For this group of countries, globalization should be a 
major spur to innovation by increasing the extent of the market. It may also 
concentrate innovative activity if it creates a more integrated global labor market 
for scientists and engineers who are then likely to aggregate in the highly 
innovative core economies. Most proxies of innovative activity (patents, research 
and development expenditures, and numbers of scientific publications) suggest a 
huge spurt in such activities in the 1990s. The rapid growth of labor productivity in 
the United States since the early 1990s also supports the notion of a surge in 
Page 7 of 27Globalization and Maritime Power
7/27/2003http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books%20-%202002/Globalization_and_Maritime_Power_De...
innovation in line with the increasing globalization of the world economy.  
On the other hand, it is not obvious that globalization is reducing or increasing this 
group’s vulnerability to oil price shocks. The standard answer is that information-
based economies use less oil per unit of GDP and, therefore, are becoming less 
dependent on imported energy. For example, in the case of the United States during 
the 1970s, oil products accounted for almost 9 percent of GDP.11 Today, the figure 
is about 3 percent. More efficient car engines are one explanation. Another is the 
steady shift of the American economy to knowledge-driven activities. Also, the 
endogenous growth countries’ flexibility and abilities to shift to alternative sources 
of energy in the short run presumably aid in minimizing the economic impact 
produced by oil price shocks. However, a good case could be made that increased 
globalization has created a greatly expanded set of macroeconomic linkages 
between these and many nonendogenous group countries who may be becoming 
more vulnerable to oil price shocks as they speed up industrialization. An oil-shock-
induced recession in these countries could feed back to the endogenous countries, 
seriously affecting their economies through declining export sales. Ultimately, then, 
the net impact of oil price movements on the endogenous countries can only be 
assessed through empirical testing. But if these countries are indeed more 
vulnerable to oil shocks, the market stability-inducing effects of naval forward 
presence become more important to them. 
Catching-up growth countries. This group of countries—starting with a lower level 
of technology and income (the “follower”)—is in the process of narrowing the 
income gap with the higher technology and richer countries (the “leader”) through a 
process of technological diffusion and capital flows from leader to follower. 
While all countries enjoy some benefit from the technological growth of the leading 
countries, the rate at which technology diffuses from leader to follower differs 
sharply around the world. A region that is geographically isolated, for example, is 
much less likely to benefit from technological diffusion. 
Two kinds of countries appear to be winners in the race in absorbing technologies 
from abroad. Countries with successful export-promotion policies, such as Korea 
and Taiwan, have earned the foreign exchange necessary to import technologies 
from abroad. Also, countries that have been able to attract large flows of foreign 
direct investment have similarly been able to upgrade technologies with particular 
success. 
There is little doubt that successful catching-up growth involves a positive feedback 
process between technological diffusion and human capital accumulation. Initially, 
human capital is low in the laggard economy, and technologies are rudimentary. 
The country may achieve some modest inflow of technology by attracting labor-
intensive export-oriented foreign direct investment—for example, labor-intensive 
assembly operations in export processing zones. These simple assembly operations 
generate income, some modest skills, and the resources to invest in improved 
education. The combination of rising skill levels and rising educational attainment 
leads to an upgrading of the foreign investment facilities. 
As with the endogenous countries, it is impossible to say much a priori about the 
manner in which increased globalization is affecting the net effects on these 
countries produced by an oil shock. On the one hand, increased globalization has 
accelerated the long-term growth path of these countries (as illustrated in table 6–2), 
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suggesting that they may be operating at close to full potential and thus be more 
vulnerable to oil price increases. On the other hand, with increased diversification, 
these economies may be able to shift to alternative sources of energy, thus avoiding 
the full brunt of the external shocks. Finally, as in the case of the endogenous 
growth countries, oil price shocks may impact indirectly through slowing the 
growth of major external markets. The matter must ultimately be resolved through 
empirical testing and simulation. 
Resource-based growth. Resource-based growth describes the process whereby an 
economy experiences cycles of per capita income mainly as the result of resource 
booms and busts. In fact, it has often been noted in recent years that natural-
resource-rich economies have faired particularly badly (see table 6–2), especially in 
comparison to many of the resource-scare economies. Even oil booms may have an 
adverse effect on oil-producing countries through the Dutch Disease mechanisms—
overvalued exchange rate, increased domestic inflation, and a shift to nontrade 
activities.12 However, given the Dutch Disease effect is a longer-term phenomenon, 
it is probably safe to conclude that at least in the case of oil producers’ increased 
globalization, the short-run effect of an oil price increase would be positive. Given 
their rigidity and lack of diversification, non-oil-producing countries would most 
likely have declines in their incomes during periods of oil price shocks, especially 
with globalization increasing their dependence on foreign markets. 
Malthusian decline. Malthusian decline is a process of falling per capita income 
caused by population pressures that outstrip the carrying capacity of the local 
economy—particularly in circumstances in which the country is neither innovating 
nor successfully adopting technologies from abroad. These countries appear to be 
experiencing a long-term decline in living standards that transcends the effects of 
terms-of-trade shocks of cyclical phenomena. Sub-Saharan Africa is the most 
disturbing case of an impoverished region suffering outright declines in living 
standards. Somewhat less dramatically, the Andean region seems also to be stocked 
with stagnant or even falling living standards. Given the economic structure of this 
group of countries, it is probably safe to assume that any trends in globalization 
would increase their vulnerability to oil price shocks. 
Economic isolation. Economic isolation is a phenomenon of economic stagnation 
that results from an economy’s physical or policy-induced isolation from world 
markets. The main problem with the landlocked countries is that their geographical 
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isolation sharply hinders international trade. In terms of increased globalization, 
foreign investors in particular do not view these impoverished nations as effective 
platforms for export-oriented foreign direct investment. Thus these countries are 
typically unable to attract the kind of assembly operations in garments, electronics, 
footwear, and other sectors that have been important steppingstones to economic 
development in more favorably located economies. Foreign investors come, if at all, 
only to exploit primary commodities with a high value per unit weight—such as oil 
and gas, diamonds, and metals—since such commodities can be profitably 
exploited even when transport costs are high. Without the diversification and 
flexibility needed to modify oil price shocks, one must conclude that these 
countries, unless hydrocarbon producers themselves, are very vulnerable to 
developments in the international oil market. 
Summary. The point of identifying distinctive national economies categorized by 
similar characteristics is the development of a hypothesis: it is reasonable to expect 
that most or all countries in a particular group would be affected in a roughly 
similar manner by external oil shocks. Behavior following oil price shocks, of 
course, is our tool for analyzing the stabilizing effects of naval forward presence. 
Building on this hypothesis, the next step is the development of an operational 
method for quantifying these country groupings and, when necessary, reclassifying 
countries to better reflect a common underlying set of global economic forces. The 
point of this analysis is to help assess the manner in which globalization has altered 
the structure of these countries over time with regard to making them more or less 
vulnerable to oil price shocks. Given the trends in globalization, this provides a 
rough tool to examine the question of which countries are benefiting more from 
naval forward presence and to what extent. Which are less affected by naval 
presence, and by how much? 
Quantifying Globalization 
One of the main hindrances to a meaningful assessment of the manner in which 
increased globalization affects the economic benefits associated with naval forward 
presence is that the term globalization remains vague, meaning different things to 
different people and groups. Currently, a consensus appears to be forming that 
globalization—whether economic, political, cultural, or environmental—is defined 
by increasing levels of interdependence over vast distances. However, a study by 
A.T. Kearny, Inc., notes few researchers have undertaken the task of actually trying 
to measure those levels of interdependency.13“For instance, how do we determine 
the extent to which a country has become embedded within the global economy? 
How do we demonstrate that globalization is racing ahead, rather than just limping 
along?”14 The lack of a clear, precise definition underlies many of the current 
arguments and debates over the extent of globalization and the manner that 
phenomenon is changing the structure of national economies. As the Kearney study 
notes: “Without the means to quantify the extent of globalization, any meaningful 
evolution of its effects will remain elusive.”15 Foreign policy scholar James Rosenau 
has also outlined many of the benefits and conceptual problems of devising a 
meaningful operational definition of globalization.16 
Previous attempts at quantification. The Kearney approach is to reverse-engineer 
globalization and break it down into component parts. On a country-by-country 
basis, Kearney quantifies the levels of personal contact across national borders by 
combining data on international travel, international phone calls, and cross-border 
Page 10 of 27Globalization and Maritime Power
7/27/2003http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books%20-%202002/Globalization_and_Maritime_Power_De...
remittances and other transfers. The A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy globalization 
index charts the World Wide Web by assessing not only its growing numbers of 
users but also the number of Internet hosts and secure servers through which they 
communicate, find information, and conduct business transactions. 
The Kearney globalization index also measures economic integration; it tracks the 
movements of goods and services by examining the changing share of international 
trade in each country’s economy; and it measures the permeability of national 
borders through the convergence of domestic and international prices. The index 
also tracks the movements of money by tabulating inward and outward direct 
foreign investment and portfolio capital flows, as well as income payments and 
receipts. 
As the Kearney study notes, much of the conventional wisdom cherished by both 
champions and critics of globalization collapses under the weight of hard data—
beliefs ranging from the pace and scale of global integration and the characteristics 
of the digital divide to the impact of globalization on income inequality, 
democratization, and corruption. 
But while the Kearney index is a step in the right direction, it still suffers from 
many of the problems associated with index construction. Several fundamental 
problems are the choice of which measures to include in the index, the ability of 
these measures to be compared across countries, and the choice of which system of 
weights to use to combine the various measures into a final summary index. Clearly 
each possible (arbitrary) weighting system will provide a somewhat different 
picture as to the extent of globalization in any particular country. The Kearney 
study does not treat these issues, but they need to be addressed before the index can 
provide any new meaningful insights to the globalization process.17 
A new approach to quantification. One way to get around this problem is to 
compile an extensive data set of the most widely used economic statistics and 
measures of world trade, such as capital flows and economic integration. Many of 
these measures will overlap and thus be redundant. Using factor analysis, however, 
the main dimensions of global diversity can be identified. 
More specifically, the basic assumption of factor analysis is that a limited number 
or underlying dimensions (factors) can be used to explain complex phenomena. The 
resulting data reduction produces a limited number of independent (uncorrelated) 
composite measures. In the current example, measures such as value added per unit 
of capital, value added per laborer, value added per firm, and so on could provide a 
composite index of productivity or relative efficiency in factor usage. One 
advantage of indexes formed in this manner is that it avoids the problem of 
selecting one measure of efficiency—such as value added per worker—over other 
logical alternatives. 
As an initial step in exploratory data analysis, factor analysis has three objectives: 
to study the correlations of a large number of variables by clustering the variables 
into factors such that variables within each factor are highly correlated; to interpret 
each factor according to the variables belonging to it; and to summarize many 
variables by a few factors. 
The usual factor analysis model expresses each variable as a function of the factors 
common to several variables and a factor unique to the variable: 
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zj = aj1F1 + aj2F2 +...+ajmFm + Uj 
where 
zj = the j
th standardized variable
 
m = the number of factors common to all the variables 
Uj = the factor unique to variable zj
 
aji = factor loadings
 
The number of factors, m, should be small, and the contribution of the unique 
factors should also be small. The individual factor loadings, aji, for each variable 
should be either very large or very small so each variable is associated with a 
minimal number of factors. 
To the extent that this factor analysis model is appropriate for the problem at hand, 
the objectives noted above can be achieved. Variables with high loadings on a 
factor tend to be highly correlated with each other, and variables that do not have 
the same loading patterns tend to be less highly correlated. Each factor is 
interpreted according to the magnitudes of the loadings associated with it. 
Perhaps more important for the problem at hand, the original variables can be 
replaced by the factors with little loss of information. Each case (firm) receives a 
score for each factor; these factor scores can be computed as: 
Fi = bi1z1 + bi2z2 +...bipzp
 
where bij are the factor score coefficients. Factor scores are in turn used in the 
discriminate analysis that follows. In general, these factor scores have less error and 
are therefore more reliable measures than the original variables. The scores express 
the degree to which each case possesses the quality or property that the factor 
describes. The factor scores have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. 
Operationally, the computations of factors and factor scores for each country are 
obtained through a principal components procedure. The data used in the analysis of 
our third study was taken from the annual World Bank World Development 
Indicators18 and include: 
? Domestic absorption (percentage of GDP)  
? Domestic credit provided by banking sector (percentage of GDP)  
? Expenditure, total (percentage of GDP)  
? Trade (percentage of GDP)  
? Trade (percentage of goods GDP)  
? Imports of goods and services (percentage of GDP)  
? Financing from abroad (percentage of GDP)  
? Foreign direct investment, net inflows (percentage of GDP)  
? Exports of goods and services (percentage of GDP)  
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? Domestic financing, total (percentage of GDP)  
? Gross private capital flows (percentage of GDP, purchasing power parity [PPP])  
? Telephone mainlines (per 1,000 people)  
? Gross foreign direct investment (percentage of GDP, PPP)  
? GDP growth (annual percentage)  
? Import growth (annual percentage)  
? Exports of goods and services (annual percentage growth)  
? Sub-Saharan dummy  
? Small country dummy  
? Oil dummy  
? Revised country classification  
Quantified dimensions of globalization. While the exact composition of factors 
varied slightly from year to year over the analysis period (1985–1997), the 20 
variables generally produced 5 main dimensions or factors: 
Structural openness depicts the degree of national economic integration into the 
world economy. Operationally, this comprises the share of imports and exports as a 
percentage of GDP. The variables comprising structural openness do not change 
much over time, and this usually is the first factor to be extracted from the data set. 
? General globalization (for lack of a better term) incorporates those variables that load on 
Sachs’ country grouping dimension (table 6–1). The third study also expands Sachs’ list of 
countries to include several additions, such as Brazil. The number of variables loading on this 
factor increases considerably over time, with the factor incorporating an increasingly diverse 
set of global indices. The third study makes clear that globalization affects each of the 
different country groupings in unique ways and that globalization is an ongoing process.  
? Finance comprises both domestic and foreign components—for example, foreign direct 
investment and financing from abroad.  
? Growth/trade expansion includes both external and internal measures of economic 
expansion. The main variables that make up this factor are import and export growth and 
overall GDP growth. GDP growth usually, but not always, is highly correlated with the 
measures of trade expansion.  
? Global structure comprises several structural variables that take into account unique country 
characteristics identified in the literature. For example, the literature suggests that the sub-
Saharan African countries may have a unique set of factors that sets them apart from other 
developing countries.19 To take this potential factor into account, a variable (SUBAF) was 
created that gives a score of zero to the non-African countries and one to the African nations. 
Researchers also contend that small countries, with much narrower resource bases 
and smaller domestic markets, are at a disadvantage in comparison to their larger 
counterparts.20To take this effect into account, the third study utilizes a unique 
variable with a value of one assigned to the smaller nations (usually those with a 
population less than 5 million), and a zero for the larger countries. 
Finally, another body of literature stresses the unique structure of the oil 
economies.21 This factor is taken into account with a final variable entitled oil, 
which assigns a value of one to the oil economies and a zero to non-oil nations. 
Revised factor scores and country groupings. Because Sachs’ classification was 
intended to examine the growth potential of a large group of countries, his country 
groupings may not be ideal for the identification of differential impacts on unique 
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economic environments stemming from oil price shocks. Also, Sachs’ classification 
scheme appears to be static. There is little evidence of movement between groups 
and no precise indication of the circumstances under which movement might take 
place. In the case of economic environments, we would expect discernable shifting 
between groups as countries and their economic policies evolve. 
To overcome these limitations, the third study used the following procedure 
(illustrated as figure 6–1).22 First, for each individual year examined, a factor 
analysis was undertaken using the 20 variables noted above. In the case of 1995, 54 
countries had complete data observations for this period and were retained in the 
analysis.23 The 20-variable data set was comprised of 5 main dimension or factors 
(based on the constraint of an eigen value [characteristic root value] of one or 
greater). 
Sachs’ country classification term was included in the second factor along with 
gross private capital flows, export share in GDP, and gross foreign direct 
investment. These variables differed significantly by country grouping. The country 
factor scores on each dimension are based on a scale with a mean of zero. Positive 
numbers indicate above-normal attainment of a particular factor or global 
dimension, while negative values indicate that the country/group is below average 
in attainment of that dimension. For example, in 1995 the trade patterns of the 
United States accounted for a considerably smaller share of GDP than the sample 
norm. The United States was even well below the norm of the endogenous growth 
countries (group 1 of table 6–1). The United States was considerably above the 
sample average for its attainment of general globalization (dimension 2) but again 
considerably below the norm for endogenous growth countries. The United States 
was, however, slightly above the norm for global financial flows. Finally, the 
country had above-average growth during this period, again somewhat above that of 
the endogenous growth countries. 
Second, using the country factor scores from this step, a discriminant analysis was 
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undertaken to assign a new set of country groupings. The five main dimensions of 
globalization noted above were weighted in reassigning countries to one of the five 
groups originally developed by Sachs. For the sample year of 1995, two 
dimensions, general globalization and trade expansion, were statistically significant 
in separating the sample countries into five main groupings. Of the original country 
classifications, 71.7 percent remained in their initial groups, with the remainder 
assigned to new groups. For example, Korea had only an 8.3 percent chance of 
being an endogenous growth (group 1) country but a 90.3 percent chance of 
correctly falling into the catching-up group (group 2). The point of the second step 
is to tailor the Sachs country classification scheme into a more dynamic analysis 
that can account for continuing globalization effects (that is, changes over time).24 
The third step entailed redefining the country classification variable from the results 
of the second step. Here, the factor analysis was rerun to generate a new set of 
factor scores, more reflective of each country’s position in the total sample and in 
its assigned group.25 
Finally, using these scores, a new discriminate analysis found that the factors of 
general globalization and global expansion were statistically significant in assigning 
countries to the five group model. On this basis, the probability of correct 
placement in one of the five groups was 92.6 percent, with all of the endogenous 
growth (group 1) countries correctly placed. This last step provides the country 
groupings and factor scores used in the oil price impact analysis. The analysis was 
undertaken for 1977, 1980, 1983, and each year for the period 1985–1997. 
Globalization and the Strength of Oil Shocks 
The revised factor scores or globalization dimensions for each country are a key 
element for assessing the manner in which oil price shocks have been modified over 
time by changes in the world economy. Using the United States as an example, the 
link between oil price shocks and globalization is outlined in figure 6–2. 
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As a starting point, a macroeconomic model was constructed for each of the 19 
countries examined. In the case of the U.S. economy, the model consisted of three 
endogenous macroeconomic variables (gross capital formation, government 
consumption, and exports [all at constant dollar prices]) and three exogenous 
variables (Japanese constant price GDP, the dollar exchange rate, and world oil 
prices). A first set of simulations for each year (1985–1997) was made using the 
historical values for oil prices. A second set of simulations was made assuming a 10 
percent increase in the price of oil for each base year. The net impact on GDP was 
then calculated by subtracting the simulations incorporating oil price shocks from 
the historical series. Oil shock impacts were calculated for the shock year and 2 
subsequent years. Finally, the resulting oil shocks were put through a regression 
analysis on the various globalization dimensions to assess the role that changes in a 
country’s level of globalization might have had in modifying the manner in which 
oil prices altered that country’s GDP. 
Based on these findings, implications were drawn (figure 6–3) for the likely future 
role of naval forward presence/crisis response. For example, if the size of oil price 
shocks increases over time for a particular country, then naval forward presence, by 
limiting the rise of oil prices, would play an increasingly important role in 
stabilizing that country’s GDP. On the other hand, if the dimensions of 
globalization lessened the loss in GDP associated with oil price shocks, then naval 
forward presence would decline in importance in providing economic benefits to 
that country. 
Economic Impact of Naval Forward Presence on America 
Using the framework developed above, a sample of 19 countries (including the 
United States) was analyzed to determine the changing strength of oil price shocks. 
Based on the results, a number of generalizations can be drawn concerning the 
likely future economic role played by naval forward presence. 
Patterns of globalization. The United States is far and away the world’s leading 
economic power. Its GDP totaled $9.3 trillion in 1999; assuming international 
purchasing power parity, this was 3 times the size of Japan’s output, 4.8 times the 
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size of Germany’s, and almost 7 times the size of the United Kingdom’s. Although 
the volume of its exports and imports exceeds that of any other country, the value of 
the U.S. external sector as a percentage of its GDP is comparatively low. Exports of 
goods and services accounted for less than 11 percent of GDP in 1999, considerably 
less than the European Union’s 25 to 29 percent in recent years.26 
As noted earlier, our approach focuses largely on 1985 to 1997, a period when 
many argue that the process of globalization began to significantly affect the 
world’s leading economies. This provides a framework for examining a large 
sample of countries in such a manner that their various unique patterns of 
globalization could be identified and then examined as possible contributing factors 
to the differing impacts of oil price shocks on national economies. This in turn 
would contribute to identifying those countries most likely to benefit from naval 
forward presence/crisis response. 
With these goals in mind, the factor/discriminant analysis of U. S. globalization 
found some significant differences between the U.S. economy and the overall norm 
for the endogenous growth (group 1) countries. Table 6–3 reports the factor scores 
on the globalization dimensions for the United States, along with the comparative 
scores for the overall endogenous growth (group 1) and catching-up (group 2) 
countries.27 From the results, three patterns can be identified: U.S. structural 
openness dimension scores are considerably below the group average which suggest 
that trade plays less of a role in the American economy than for other advanced 
industrial nations; the U.S. general globalization dimension is also somewhat below 
the group norm; and U.S. financial globalization and growth in the world market are 
above the pattern typically found in other advanced countries. 
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Recent patterns of U.S. globalization (as in the other endogenous growth/group 1 
countries) have been characterized by a rapid increase in the general globalization 
dimension (illustrated by figure 6–4). Contrary to popular belief, the United States 
has not dramatically increased its position relative to other countries with regard to 
the other dimensions of globalization—particularly global openness, financial 
flows, or expansion in the global economy. This finding is consistent with recent 
conclusions by Robert Dunn.28 While Dunn’s main conclusion is that the U.S. 
economy is far from being completely globalized, our findings suggest that, at least 
with regard to the general globalization dimension, significant movement has been 
made in that direction. 
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Globalization and oil price shocks. With regard to the impact of oil price shocks on 
its economy, the United States has the normal pattern of a positive sign (indicated 
in table 6–4) associated with increased levels of general globalization. Over time, 
and everything else being equal, oil price shocks have been stronger because of 
globalization, and there has been a significant increase in the amount of GDP loss 
associated with oil price shocks (illustrated in figures 6–5 and 6–6). 
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Implications for naval forward presence. The above finding suggests that in the 
absence of offsetting effects produced by the other dimensions of globalization, 
future naval forward presence should be increasingly important to the U.S. 
economy by dampening oil price increases caused by destabilizing events. 
Economic Impact of Naval Forward Presence on Other Countries 
A similar analysis was undertaken in the third study for 18 additional countries 
whose selection was largely dictated by the available data. Here, the analysis found 
clear linkage between the globalization-defined country groupings and the manner 
in which oil shocks affect their economies (illustrated in table 6–5). Over time, and 
contrary to popular opinion, endogenous growth (group 1) countries have become 
more vulnerable to oil price shocks. The oil shock-driven loss in income as a 
percent of GDP has increased gradually over time and in line with the process of 
globalization. In other words, a 10 percent increase in the price of oil today would 
cause greater reductions in national income than it would in previous years. For 
endogenous growth countries (advanced economies), general globalization and 
structural openness have been the factors most responsible for the increased severity 
of oil shocks. Neither of these factors is easily controlled by governments without 
considerable damage to economic growth. Changes in the factors of financial 
globalization and in the global growth dimension of globalization have played a 
much smaller role.29 In fact, increases in these factors have made some countries 
less vulnerable and others more vulnerable—with no clear patterns emerging from 
these aspects of globalization. 
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Because naval forward presence/crisis response tends to suppress oil shocks and 
return prices to their equilibrium levels, the role of such naval activities should be 
of increasing benefit to all endogenous growth countries, as well as all 
industrialized countries seeking to enter that category. With the likely continuation 
of global trends, naval forward presence/crisis response should play an even greater 
positive role for global economic stability in the foreseeable future. 
Of course, this economic stability may not benefit individual oil-producing states. 
The two oil economies included in the study, Mexico and Norway, would likely 
experience declines in income associated with forward deployed naval operations—
even as such operations benefit their national security interests. On the other hand, 
movements in globalization have resulted in Norway obtaining diminishing 
economic gains from oil price shocks, while Mexico’s gains have stabilized rather 
than increased. 
A very different globalization/oil shock pattern characterizes the catching-up 
countries (group 2). Over time, increases in the factor of general globalization have 
lessened the impact of oil price shocks on these countries, while trends in the 
financial dimension have worked to increase their severity. The net effect is that 
countries such as the Philippines, Portugal, and South Africa have experienced a 
gradual increase in the severity of oil price shocks. In Korea’s case, the forces of 
globalization have appeared to neutralize each other. But the net effect has still been 
a rather constant loss in national income associated with oil price shocks. Given 
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these patterns, naval forward presence/crisis response should continue to play an 
important role (but a less critical role than for group 1 countries) in stabilizing the 
national economies of group 2 countries. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The findings of all three Naval Postgraduate School studies (1997, 2000, 2001), 
combined with anticipated trends in globalization, suggest that the Navy’s forward 
presence is more than likely to produce economic benefits to the United States and 
the other major industrial economies in the years to come. Increased integration of 
markets should aid in transmitting the Navy’s stabilizing effect on markets. 
Figure 6–7 conceptualizes and summarizes the effect of naval forward presence as a 
factor in our refined globalization model. 
It is likely that increased world trade and increased economic growth associated 
with globalization will place a growing demand on oil supplies—creating, in turn, 
the chance of more volatile oil shocks associated with crises around the world. 
Statistical evidence indicates that endogenous growth countries (such as the United 
States) sustain the greatest economic damage when oil price shocks occur. These 
are also the countries that fuel overall global economic growth. That fact, in itself, 
increases the positive economic impact of naval forces during forward-deployed 
naval operations. Similar arguments can be made for the effects on the share and 
foreign exchange markets. 
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Summing up, the third study’s findings confirm and reinforce our original findings 
as to the significant and positive economic impacts associated with naval forward 
presence and crisis response. We have now examined seven cases and in each found 
benefits of at least $1 billion (over $50 billion in the Gulf War) to the U. S. 
economy. The third study’s categorization of globalization and assessment of 
globalization factors indicate that, with regard to globalization, naval actions are 
seen to complement the positive impact that increased globalization has had on the 
American economy. In addition, it is argued that naval forward presence and crisis 
response tended to strengthen the process of globalization by providing stability and 
security for markets. Increased integration of markets should aid in transmitting the 
Navy’s stabilizing effect on markets, while naval presence should aid in speeding up 
the process of globalization, which in and of itself is providing significant benefits 
to the American economy. 
The statistical findings presented by the series of studies confirm many of the 
educated guesses made in earlier assessments concerning the links between naval 
actions, markets, and the U.S. economy. Likely changes in the various facets of 
globalization should strengthen the economic impacts of naval forward presence 
and crisis response. In turn, the stability provided by naval forward presence should 
assure continued deepening of the globalization process. This would set up a 
virtuous or self-replicating cycle that would reinforce itself over time. 
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